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HON. STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, 

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ON THE 



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MEASURES OF ADJUSTMENT," 



DELIVERED IN THE CITY HALL, CHICAGO, OCTOBER 23, 1S50. 



WASHINGTON: 

GIDEON & CO., PRINTERS 
1851. 



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S P E E C H 



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HON STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, 



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MEASURES OF ADJUSTMENT, 



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DELIVERED IN THE CITS' BALL, CHICAGO, OCTOBER 23, 1850. 



WASHINGTON: 

GIDEON & CO., PRINTERS 
1851. 



Bos. Pa a. Lib. 
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PREFACE 



The following speech was made under peculiar circumstances. The two Senators from 
Illinois had sustained all the measures of adjustment. Upon his return home, Mr. Douglas 
found that the provisions of the Fugitive bill had been so grossly misrepresented, that 
public opinion was loud and fierce in its condemnation. The common council of the 
city of Chicago, in their official capacity, parsed resolutions denouncing the law as a violation 
of the Constitution of the United States and of the higher law of God, and those Senators and 
Representatives who voted for it, and also those who were absent and consequently did not vote 
against it, as traitors, Benedict Arnolds, and Judas Iscariots. The council also released the 
"citizens, officers, and police of the city" from all obligation to assist or participate in the execu- 
tion of the law, and declared that "it ought not to be respected by any intelligent community." 
On the next night, a mass meeting of the citizens was held for the purpose of approving and 
sanctioning the action of the common council, and organizing violent and successful resistance 
to the execution of the law. A committee reported to this meeting a series of resolutions more 
revolutionary in their character, and going to a greater extent in resisting the authority of the 
Federal Government, than even those of the common council. Numerous speeches, in support 
of the resolutions, were received with boisterous and furious applause, pledging their authors to 
resist even unto the dungeon and the grave. At length Mr. Douglas, being the only member 
of the Illinois delegation then in the city, appeared upon the stand, and stated, that in consequence 
of the action of the common council and the phrenzied excitement which seemed to rage all 
around him, he desired to be heard before the assembled people of the city in vindication of all 
the measures of adjustment, and especially of the Fugitive Slave law. He said he would not 
make a speech that night, because the call for the meeting was not sufficiently broad to autho- 
rize a speech in defence of those measures; but he would avail himself of that opportunity to give 
notice that on the next night he would address the people of Chi"ago upon these subjects. He 
invited men of all parties and shades of opinion to attend and participate in the proceedings, and 
assured them that he would answer every objection made, and every question which should be 
propounded, touching the measures of adjustment, and especially the Fugitive bill. After fur- 
ther discussion, and much confusion jjand opposition, the meeting was induced to adjourn, and 
hear Mr. Douglas's defence before they would condemn him. In the mean time, the excitement 
continued to increase, and the next night (Oct. 23d) a tremendous concourse of people assembled 
— by far the largest meeting ever held in the city — and Mr. Douglas delivered a speech, of which 
the following is a fair and tolerably good report, so far as to embrace the argument, omitting 
necessarily numerous incidents which could not be preserved by the reporter. The meeting 
then resolved unanimously to faithfully carry into effect the provisions of the Fugitive Slave law, 
and to perform every other duty and obligation under the Constitution of the United States. 
The meeting also adopted, with only eight or ten dissenting voices, a resolution repudiating the 
action of the common council, and then adjourned with nine cheers — three for Douglas, three for 
the Constitution, and three for our glorious Union. On the next night, the common council of 
the city of Chicago again assembled, and repealed their nullifying resolutions by a vote of 12 to 1. 



SPEECH 



Mr. DOUGLAS, said: 

The agitatiou on the subject of Slavery now raging through the breadth of 
the land presents a most extraordinary spectacle. Congress, after a protracted 
session of nearly ten months, succeeded in passing a system of measures, 
which are believed to be just to all parts of the Republic, and ought to be 
satisfactory to the people. The South has not triumphed over the North, nor 
has the North achieved a victory over the South. Neither party has made 
any humiliating concessions to the other. Each has preserved its honor, 
while neither has surrendered an important right, or sacrificed any substantial 
interest. The measures composing the scheme of adjustment are believed to 
be in harmony with the principles of justice and the Constitution. 

And yet we find that the agitation is re-opened in the two extremes of the 
Union with renewed vigor and increased violence. In some of the Southern 
States, special sessions of the Legislatures are being called for the purpose of 
organizing systematic and efficient measures of resistance to the execution of 
the laws of the land, and for the adoption of Disunion as the remedy. In the 
Northern States, municipal corporations, and other organized bodies of men, 
are nullifying the acts of Congress, and raising the standard of rebellion 
against the authority of the Federal Government. 

At the South, the measures of adjustment are denounced as a disgraceful 
surrender of Southern rights to Northern abolitionism. 

At the North, the same measures are denounced with equal violence as & 
total abandonment of the rights of freemen to conciliate the slave power. 

The Southern disunioaists repudiate the authority of the highest judicial 
tribunal on earth, upon the ground that it is a pliant and corrupt instrument in 
the hands of Northern fanaticism. 

The Northern nullifiers refuse to submit the points at issue to the same 
exalted tribunal, upon the ground that the Supreme Court of the United States 
is a corrupt and supple instrument in the hands of the Southern slave-ocracy. 

For these contradictory reasons the people in both sections of the Union are 
called upon to resist the laws of the land, and the authority of the Federal 
Government, by violence, even unto death and disunion. 

Strange and contradictory positions! 

Both cannot be true, and I trust in God neither may prove to be. We have 
fallen on evil times, when passion, and prejudice, and ambition, can so blind 
the judgments and deaden the consciences of men, that the truth cannot be 



seen and felt. The people of the North, or the South, or both, are acting 
under a fatal delusion. Should we not pause, and reflect, and consider, whe- 
ther we, as well as they, have not been egregiously deceived upon this subject? 
It is my purpose this evening to give a candid and impartial exposition of these 
measures, to the end that the truth may be known. It does not become a free, 
people to rush madly and blindly into violence, and bloodshed, and death, and 
disunion, without first satisfying our consciences upon whose souls the guilty 
consequences must rest. 

The measures, known as the Adjustment or Compromise scheme, are six in 
number: 

1. The admission of California, with her free constitution. 

2. The creation of a Territorial government for Utah, leaving the people to 
regulate their own domestic institutions. 

3. The creation of a Territorial government for New Mexico, with like pro- 
visions. 

4. The adjustment of the disputed boundary with Texas. 

5. The abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia. 

6. The Fugitive Slave bill. 

The first three of these measures — California, Utah, and New Mexico— I 
prepared with my own hands, and reported from the Committee on Tenitorie.-, 
as its chairman, in the precise shape in which they now stand on the statute 
book, with one or two unimportant amendments, for which 1 also voted. I, 
therefore, hold myself responsible to you, as my constituents, for those mea- 
sures as they passed. If there is anything wrong in them, hold me account- 
able; if there is anything of merit, give the credit to those who passed the 
bills. These, measures are predicated on the great fundamental principle that 
every people ought to possess the right of forming and regulating their own 
internal concerns and domestic institutions in their own way. It was suppo-ed 
that those of our fellow citizens who emigrated to the shores of the Pacific and 
to our other territories, were as capable of self-government as their neighbors 
and kindred w hum they left behind them; and there was no reason for believ- 
ing that they have lost any of their intelligence or patriotism by the wayside, 
while crossing the Isthmus or the Plains. It was also believed, that after their 
arrival in the country, when they had become familiar with its topography, 
climate, production.-, and resources, and had connected their destiny with it, 
they Were fully as competent to judge for themselves what kind of laws and 
institutions were best adapted to their condition and interests, as we were who 
never saw the country, and knew very little about it. To question their compe- 
tency to do this, was to deny their capacity for self-government. If they have 
the requisite intelligence and honesty to be intrusted with the enactment, of 
laws for the government of white men, I know of no reason, why they shdul l 
not be ueemed competent to legislate for the negro, if they are sufiicieritlj 



enlightened to make laws for the protection of life, liberty, and property — -oi 
morals and education — to determine the relation of husband and wife, of 
parent and child — I am not aAvare that it requires any higher degree of civili- 
zation to regulate the affairs of master and servant. These things are all con- 
fided by the Constitution to each State to decide for itself, and I know of no 
reason why the same principle should not be extended to the Territories. My 
votes and acts have been in accordance with these views in all cases, except 
the instances in which I voted under your instructions. Those were your 
votes, and not mine. I entered my protest against them at the time — before 
and after they were recorded — and shall never hold myself responsible for 
them. I believed then, and believe now, that it was better for the cause of 
freedom, of humanity, and of republicanism, to leave the people interested to 
settle all these questions for themselves. They have intellect and consciences 
as well as we, and have more interest in doing that which is best for them- 
selves and their posterity, than we have as their self-constituted and officious 
guardians. I deem it fortunate for the peace and harmony of the country 
that Congress, taking the same view of the subject, rejected the Proviso, and 
passed the bills in the shape in which I originally reported them. So far as 
slavery is concerned, I am sure that any man who will take the pains to 
examine the history of the question, will come to the conclusion that this is 
the true policy, as well as the sound republican doctrine. Mr. Douglas 
here went into a historical view of the subject, to show that Slavery had 
never been excluded in fact from one inch of the American Continent by act 
of Congress. When the Federal Constitution was formed in '87, twelve of 
the thirteen States, then composing the Confederation, held slaves, and sus- 
tained the institution of slavery by their laws. Since that period slavery had 
been abolished in six of these twelve original slave States. Ho a- was this 
effected? Not by an act of Congress. Not by the interposition of the Federal 
Government. Congress had no power over the subject, and never attempted 
to interfere with it. Slavery was abolished in those States by the people of 
each, acting for themselves, and upon their own motion and responsibility. 
The people became convinced that it was for their own interests, and the 
interests of their posterity, pecuniarily and morally, and they did it of their 
own free will, and rigidly enforced their own laws. 

So it was in the territory northwest of the Ohio river. By the act of Congress, 
known as the Ordinance of '87, slavery was prohibited by law, but not exclud- 
ed in fact. Slavery existed in the Territories of Illinois and Indiana, in spite 
of the ordinance, under the authority of the territorial laws. Illinois was a 
slaveholding Territory in defiance of the act of Congress, bat became a free 
State by the action of our own people, when they framed our State constitution, 
preparatory to their admission into the Union. So it was with Indiana. Ore- 
gon prohibited slavery by the action of her people under their provisional govern- 



8 

ment, several years before Congress established a territorial government In 
short, wherever slavery has been excluded, and (vee institutions established, it 
has been done by the voluntary action of the people interested. Wherever 
Congress attempted to interfere in opposition to the wishes of the people of the 
territorv, its enactments remained a dead letter upon the statute book, and the 
people took such legislative action as comported with their inclinations and sup- 
posed interests. 

Mr. Douglas then referred to the country acquired from Mexico, and called 
the attention of the audience to the fact that the abolitionist-, had all predicted 
that slavery would certainly be introduced into those territories, unless Congress 
interfered and prohibited it by law, and condemned him because he was oppos- 
ed to such interference. The problem is now solved. What was then a matter 
of opinion and disputation, has become an historical fact. Time has settled the 
controversy, and shown who was right and who was wrong. The Wilmot Proviso 
was not adopted. Congress did not prohibit slavery in those territories, and yet 
slavery does not exist in them. In California, it was prohibited by the people 
in the constitution with which that State was admitted into the Union. It is 
well known that the people of New Mexico, when they formed a constitution 
with the. view of asking admission, also prohibited slavery. These facts show- 
conclusively that all the predictions of the abolitionists upon this subject have 
been falsified by history, and that my own have been literally fulfilled. I refer to 
these facts, not in the spirit of self-gratulation, but to show that these men, who 
have alarmed the friends of freedom, and for a time partially controlled the 
popular sentiment, were themselves mistaken, and misled their followers; at the 
same time that their doctrine was at war with the whole spirit of our republi- 
can institutions. 

But let us return to the measures immediately under discussion. It must be 
conceded that the question of the admission of California was not free from dif- 
ficulty, independent of the subject of slavery. There were many irregularities 
in the proceedings; in fact, every step in her application for admission was 
irregular, when viewed with reference to a literal compliance with the most 
approved rules and usages in the admission of new States. On the other hand, 
it should be b6rne in mind that this resulted from the necessity of the case. 
Congress had failed to perform its duty — had established no territorial govern- 
ment, and made no provision for her admission into the Union. She was left 
without government, and was therefore compelled to provide one for herself. She 
could not conform to rules which had not been established, nor comply with 
laws which Congress had failed to enact. The same irregularities had occurred, 
however, and been waived, in the admission of other States under peculiar cir- 
cumstances. True, they had not all occurred in the case of anyone State; but 
some had in one, others in another; so that, by looking into the circumstances 
attending the admission of each of the new States, we find that all of these 



irregularities, as they are called, had intervened and been waived in the course 
of our legislative history. Besides, the territory of California was too exten- 
sive for one State, (if we are to adopt the old States as a guide in carving out 
new ones,) being about three times the size of New York; and her boundaries 
were unnatural and unreasonable, disregarding the topography of the country, 
and embracing the whole mining region and her coast in the limits. Thus it 
will be seen that the slavery question was not the only real difficulty that the 
admission of California presented to the minds of calm and reflecting men; 
although it cannot be denied that it was the exciting cause, which stimulated 
a large portion of the people in one section to demand her instant admission, 
and in the other, to insist upon her unconditional rejection. Even in this point 
of view, I humbly conceive that the ultras in each extreme of the Republic 
acted under a misconception of their true interests and real policy. The whole 
of California — from the very nature of the country, her rocks and sands, elevation 
above the sea, climate, soil, and productions — was bound to be free territory 
by the decision of her own people, no matter when admitted or how divided. 
Hence, if considered with reference to the preponderance of political power 
between the free and slaveholding States, it was manifestly the true policy of 
the South to include the whole country in one State; while the same reasons 
should have induced the North to subdivide it into as many States as the extent 
of the territory would justify. But, in my opinion, it was not proper for Con- 
gress to act upon any such principle. We should know no North, no South, 
in our legislation; but lock to the interests of the whole country. By our action 
in this case, the rights and privileges of California and the Pacific coast were 
principally to be affected. By erecting the country into one State instead of 
three, the people are to be represented in the Senate by two in the place of six 
Senators. If their interests suffer in consequence, they can blame no one but 
themselves; for Congress only confirmed what they had previously done. The 
problem in relation to slavery should have been much more easily solved. It 
was a question which concerned the people of California alone. The other 
States of the Union had no interest in it, and no right to interfere with it. South 
Carolina settled that question within her own limits to suit herself; Illinois has 
decided it in a manner satisfactory to her own people; and upon what principle 
are we to deprive the people of the State of California of a right which is com- 
mon to every State in the Union ? 

The bills establishing territorial governments for Utah and New Mexico are 
.silent upon the subject of slavery; except the provision that, when they should 
be admitted into the Union as States, each should decide the question of slavery 
for itself. This latter provision was not incorporated in my original bills, for 
the reason that I conceived it to involve a principle so clearly deducible from 
the Constitution that it was unnecessary to embody it in the form of le^al 
enactment. But when it was offered as an amendment to the bills, I cheer- 



10 

fully voted for it, lest its rejection should be deemed a denial of the principle 
asserted in it. The abolitionists of the North profess to regard these bills as 
a total abandonment of the principles of freedom, because they do not contain 
an express prohibition of slavery; while the ultras of the South denounce the 
same measures as equivalent to the Wilmot Proviso. 

Of tlie Texas boundary I have but little to say, for the reason that I have 
scarcely heard it alluded to since my return home, although many complaints 
are made against it in other portions of the free States. Jt was an unfortunate 
dispute, which could result in no practical benefit to either party, no matter 
how decided. The territory in controversy was of no considerable value. If 
there was a spot upon the face of the American continent more worthless 
than any other; if there was a barren waste more desolate — sands more arid, 
and rocks more naked than all others — it was the country in dispute between 
Texas and the United States. Distant from navigation, and almost inaccessible 
for want of means of communication; void of timber, fuel, water or soil, with 
the exception of here and there a nook in the gorges of the mountains; it was 
entirely useless, save as it afforded hiding places for the wild and roaming savages. 
And yet the controversy was none the less serious and fierce in consequence 
of the barrenness of the country. Texas believed it to be hers, and deemed 
it a point of honor to maintain her title at all hazards and against all odds. 
Many of the States entertained doubts of the validity of the Texan claim, while 
others considered it entirely without foundation. In this state of the case, 
each party having partial possession, was mustering troops to render its pos- 
-ion complete to the exclusion of the other. Many of the slaveholding 
States, from sympathy with the peculiar institutions of Texas, were preparing 
to array themselves on the one side; while most of the free States, from aver- 
sion to those institutions, were expected to array themselves on the other. 
Thus were we plunging headlong and madly into a civil war, involving results 
which no human wisdom could foresee, and consequences which could be con- 
templated only with horror. 

Fortunately this unnatural struggle was averted by the timely and judicious 
interposition of Congress. The Committee on Territories, to whom the subject 
h?d been referred, found it impossible to ascertain and agree upon the true 
boundary line of Texas, and accordingly authorized me, as their chairman, to 
report a bill for adjusting the boundary upon an arbitrary but convenient line, 

drawn through the centre of the Desert, and to pay Texas dollars 

for relinquishing her claim to the waste lands outside of that line. I, there- 
fore, reported this provision, at the same time that I brought in the bills for 
California, Utah, and New Mexico, with the intention of moving to fill the 
blank with ten millions of dollars. When the Committee of Thirteen, which 
was subsequently appointed, united into one the several bills which had been re- 
ported by the Committee on Territories, and thus formed what has been known 



11 

as the " Omnibus Bill/' they made a slight change in the line which had been 
agreed upon by the Territorial committee. Upon the defeat of the Omnibus, 
Mr. Pierce, of Maryland, brought in a separate bill for adjusting this boundary, 
predicated upon the principle, also, of an arbitrary but convenient line through 
the Desert, changing the courses, however, so as to obviate some objections 
which have been urged to the others, and paying Texas ten millions of dol- 
lars for relinquishing her claim. This bill, after having been joined in the 
House of Representatives to the bill establishing a Territorial government for 
New Mexico, passed both Houses, and became the law of the land. The peo- 
ple of Texas have since ratified it at the polls by an overwhelming majority; 
and thus this dangerous element of agitation has been withdrawn from the con- 
troversy by the mutual assent of the parties. And yet there are organized 
parties, in both extremes of the Union, who are striving to re-open the contro- 
versy by persuading the people that the rights and interests of their own par- 
ticular section have been basely betrayed in the settlement of this question. 
At the South, it is boldly proclaimed, and exevy where repeated, that sixty thou- 
sand square miles of slave -territory have been sold and converted into free-soil. 
On the other hand, the Northern nullifiers and Abolitionists are industriously 
impressing it upon the people that more than fifty thousand square miles of free- 
soil have been transferred to Texas, and converted into slave-territory by the 
act of Congress adjusting the Texas boundary. Such are the extremities to 
which prejudice and ambition can lead desperate men ! Neither party has 
gained or lost any thing, so far as the question of slavery is concerned. Texas 
has gained ten millions of dollars, and the United States have saved, in blood 
and treasure, the expenses of a civil war. 

The next in the series of measures was the bill for the abolition of the slave 
trade in the district of Columbia. This bill was prepared and reported by the 
Committee of Thirteen, and I gave it my cordial support. It has been repre- 
ited at the South as a concession to the North, to induce us to perform our 
duties under the Constitution in the surrender of fugitives from labor, and 
much opposition has been raised against the whole scheme of adjustment on 
that account. I did not regard it in that light. My vote was given upon no 
such considerations. 1 believed each of the measures substantially right in 
itself, and, under the extraordinary circumstances by which we wore sur- 
rounded, eminently wise and expedient. The bill does nut abolish slavery in 
the district — doer, not emancipate the few slaves that are there, and interferes 
with no man's right of property. It simply provides that slaves shall not be 
brought from the surrounding States, or elsewhere, into the district for sale. In 
this respect, Congress only followed the example of the legislatures of Mary- 
land, North Carolina, Kentucky, and, in tact, most of the slaveholding States. 
The country embraced within the limits of the District of Columbia, therefore, 
stands in precisely the same relation to the slave trade under this law, .that it 



12 

would have stood under the laws of Maryland, if it had never been sep- 
arated from that State. What justification can there be, then, for the assertion 
that this was a concession to the North? It does nothing more nor less than to 
apply the general principles of the legislation of a majority of the Southern 
States to the District of Columbia. Bat, while it was no concession from one 
section to the other, I had a right to expect that those modern philanthropists 
who have declaimed so eloquently and violently against the disgrace of the Na- 
tional Capitol, by the slave trade within its precincts, would have rejoiced with 
exceeding joy at the passage of this act. I have listened in vain for one word 
of approval or commendation from the advocates of abolition and nullification. 
While the whole series of Compromise measures are denounced in coarse and 
unmeasured terms, not one word of congratulation to the friends of freedom — 
not a word of approval of the act or of the conduct of those who voted for it — is 
allowed to escape their lips. All the other measures of the scheme of adjust- 
ment are attempted to be kept in the background, and concealed from the pub 
lie view, in order that more prominence and importance may be given to what 
they are pleased to call "the infamcus fucitive slave bill." 

Before I proceed to the exposition of that bill, I will read the preamble and 
resolutions passed by the common council of this city, night before lasU 

Mr. Douglass then read as follows: 

Whereas, The Constitution of the United alives in Congress from the Free States, who 

States piovidt.s that the privilege of ;he writ of aided and assisted in the passage of this infa- 

Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless mous taw, and those who basely sneaked away 

when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the from their seats, and thereby evaded ilie ques- 

publie safely may require it; and, tion, richly merit the reproach of all lovers of 

Whereas, The late act of Congress, purport- freedom, and are fit only to be ranked with the 
ing to be for the recovery of fugitive slaves, traitors, Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot, 
virtually suspends the Habeas Corpus and who betrayed his Lord and Master for thirty- 
abolishes the right of trial by jury, and by its pieces of silver. 

provisions, not only fugitive slaves, but white Jlnd Resolved, That the citizens, officers, and 
men, "owing service" to another in another police of the city be, and they are hereby, re- 
Slate, viz., the apprentice, the mechanic, the quested to abstain from any and all interference 
farmer, the laborer engaged on contract or oth- in the capture and delivering up of the fugitive 
erwise, whose terms of service are unexpired, from unrighteous oppression, of whatever na- 
may be captured and carried ofi* summarily, tion, name, or color. 
and without legal resource of any kind; and, Resolved, That the fugitive slave law lately 

Whereas, JS T <> law can be legally or morally passed by Congress is a cruel and unjust law, 

binding on us which violates the provisions of and ought not to be respected by any intelli- 

the Constitution; and, gent community, and that this Council will not 

Whereas, Above all, in the responsibilities require the city police to render any assistance 

of human life, and the practice and propagation f r i he arrest of fugitive slaves. 

of Christianity, the lawsof God should be held Ayes — Aid. Milliken, Loyd, Sherwood, 

paramount to all human compacts and statutes: Foss, Throop, Sherman, Richards, Brady, and 

Therefore, Dodge. 

Resolved, That the Senators and Represent- Nays — Aid. Page and Williams. 

But for the passage of these resolutions, said Mr. D., I should not have ad- 
dressed you this evening, nor, indeed, at any time before my return to the 
Capitol. I have no desire to conceal or withhold my opinions, no wish to avoid 
the responsibility of a full and frank expression of them, upon this and all other 
.subjects which were embraced in the action of the last session of Congress. 



13 

My reasons for wishing to avoid public discussion at this time, were to be found 
in the state of my health and the short time allowed me to remain among you. 

Now to the resolutions. I make no criticism upon the language in which 
they are expressed; that is a matter of taste, and in every thing of that kind I 
defer to the superior refinement of our city fathers. But it cannot be disguised 
that the polite epithets of '"traitors, Benedict Arnold and Judas Iscariot, who 
betrayed his lord and master for thirty pieces of silver/- will be understood 
abroad as having a direct personal application to my esteemed colleague, Gen. 
Shields, and myself. Whatever may have been the intention of those who voted 
for the resolutions, I will do the members of the council the justice to say, 
that I do not believe they intended to make any such application. But 
their secret intentions are of little consequence, when they give their official 
sanction to a charge of infamy, clothed in such language that every man who 
reads it must give it a personal application. The whole affair, however, looks 
strange, and even ludicrous, when contrasted with the cordial reception and 
public demonstrations of kindness tnd confidence, and even gratitude for sup- 
posed services, extended to my colleague and myself upon our arrival in this 
city one week ago. Then we were welcomed home as public benefactors, and 
invited to partake of a public dinner, by an invitation numerously signed by 
men of all parties and shades of opinion. The invitation had no sooner been 
declined, for reasons which were supposed to be entirely satisfactory, and my 
colleague started for his home, than the common council, who are presumed to 
speak officially for the whole population of the city, attempted to brand their 
honored guests with infamy, and denounce them as Benedict Arnolds and Ju- 
das Iscariots! I have read somewhere that it was a polite custom, in other 
countries and a different age, to invite those whom they secretly wished to 
destroy to a feast, in order to secure a mure convenient opportunity of admin- 
istering the hemlock! I acquit the common council of any design of intro- 
ducing that custom into our hospitable city. But I have done with this sub- 
ject, so far as it has a personal bearing. 

It is a far more important and serious matter, when viewed with reference 
to the principles involved, and the consequences which may result. The com- 
mon council of the city of Chicago have assumed to themselves the right, 
and actually exercised the power, of determining the validity of an act of Con- 
gress, and have declared it void upon the ground that it violates the Constitu- 
tion of the United States and the law of God! They have gone further; they 
declared, by a solemn official act, that a law passed by Congress "ought not 
to be respected by any intelligent community," and have called upon "the 
citizens, officers, and police of the city'' to abstain from rendering any aid or 
assistance in its execution! What, is this but naked, unmitigated nullification? 
An act of the American Congress nullified by the common council of the city 
of Chicago! Whence did the council derive their authority? I have been able 



14 

to find no such provision in the city charter, nor am I aware that the legisla- 
ture of Illinois is vested with any rightful power to confer such authority. 
T have yet to learn that a subordinate municipal corporation is licensed to raise 
the standard of rebellion, and throw off the authority of the Federal Government, 
at pleasure! This is a great improvement upon South Carolinian nullification. 
It dispenses with the trouble, delay, and expense of convening legislatures and 
assembling conventions of the people, for the purpose of resolving themselves 
back into their original elements, preparatory to the contemplated revolution. 
It has the high merit of marching directly to its object, and by a simple resolu- 
tion, written and adopted on the same night, relieving the people from their 
oa*hs and allegiance, and of putting ths nation and its laws at defiance! It has 
heretofore been supposed, by men of antiquated notions, who have not kept up 
with ihe progress of the age, that the Supreme Court of the United States was in- 
vested with the power of determining the validity of an act of Congress pass- 
ed in pursuance of the forms of the Constitution. This was the doctrine of the 
entire North, and of the nation, when it became necessary to exert the whole 
power of the Government to put down nullification in another portion of the 
Union. But the spirit of the age is progressive, and is by no means confined 
to advancement in the arts and physical sciences. The science of politics and 
of government is also rapidly advancing to maturity and perfection. It is not 
ince that I heard an eminent lawyer propose an important reform in the 
admirable judicial system of our State, which, he thought, would render it 
perfect. It was so simple and eminently practicable, that it could not fail to 
excite the admiration of even the casual inquirer. His proposition was, that 
our judicial system should be so improved as to allow an appeal, on all consti- 
tutional questions, from the supreme court of this State to two justices of the 
peace! When that shall have been effected, but one other reform will be neces- 
sary to render our national system perfect, and that is, to change the federal 
Constitution, so as to authorize an appeal, upon all questions touching the va- 
lidity of acts of Congress, from the Supreme Court of the United States to the 
common council of the city of Chicago! 

So much for the general principles involved in the acts of the council. 1 
will now examine briefly the specific grounds of objection urged by the council 
against the Fugitive Slave bill, as reasons why it should not be obeyed. 

The objections are two in number : first, that it suspends the writ of habeas 
corpus in time of peace, in violation of the Constitution ; secondly, that it 
abolishes the right of trial by jury. 

How the council obtained the information that these two odious provisions 
were contained in the law, I am unable to divine. One thing is certain, that 
the members of the council, who voted for these resolutions, had never read the 
law, or they would have discovered their mistake. There is not one word in 
it in respect to the writ of habeas corpus or the right of trial by jury. Neither 



15 

of these subjects is mentioned or referred to. The law is entirely silent on 
those points. Is it to be said that an act of Congress, which is silent on the 
subject, ought to be construed to repeal a great constitutional right by implica- 
tion ? Besides, this act is only an amendment — amendatory of the old law — 
the act of 1793 — but does not repeal it. There is no difference between the 
original act and the amendment, in this respect. Both are silent in regard to 
the writ of habeas corpus and the right of trial by jury. If to be silent is to 
suspend the one and abolish the other, then the mischief was done by the old 
lav/ fifty-seven years ago. If this construction be correct, the writ of habeas 
corpus has been suspended, and trial by jury abolished, more than half a century, 
without anybody ever discovering the fact, or, if knowing it, without uttering 
a murmur of complaint. 

Mr. Douglas then read the whole of the act of 1793, and compared its pro- 
visions with the amendment of last session, for the purpose of showing that, 
the writ of habeas corpus and the right of trial by jury were not alluded to or 
interfered with by either. But I maintain, said Mr. D., that the writ of 
habeas corpus is applicable to the case of the arrest of a fugitive under this 
law, in the same sense in which the Constitution intended to confer it, and to 
the fullest extent for which that writ is ever rightfully issued in any case. In 
this I am fully sustained by the opinion of Mr. Crittenden, the Attorney 
General of the United States. As soon as the bill passed the two Houses of 
Congress, an abolition paper raised the alarm that the habeas corpus had been 
suspended, The cry was eagerly caught up, and transmitted, by lightning, 
upon the wires, to every part of the Union, by those whose avocation is agita- 
tion. The President of the United States, previous to signing the bill, referred 
it to the Attorney General, for his opinion upon the point whether any portion 
of it violated any provision of the Constitution of the United States, and 
especially whether it could possibly be construed to suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus. I have the answer of the Attorney General before me, in which he 
gives it as his decided opinion that every part of the law is entirely consistent 
with the Constitution, and that it does not suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 
I would commend the argument of the Attorney General to the careful perusal 
of those who have doubts upon the subject. Upon the presentation of this 
opinion, and with entire confidence in its correctness, President Filmore signed 
the bill. 

[Here Mr. Douglas was interrupted by a person present, who called his 
attention to the last clause of the 6th section of the bill, which he read, and 
asked him what construction he put upon it, if it did not suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus.] 

Mr. Douglas, in reply, expressed his thanks to the gentleman who pro- 
pounded the inquiry. His object was to meet every point, and remove every 
doubt that could possibly be raised ; and he expressed the hope that every 



16 

gentleman present would exercise the privilege of asking him questions upon 
all points upon which he was not fully satisfied. He then proceeded to answer 
the question which had been propounded. That section of the bill provides 
for the arrest of the fugitive and the trial before the commissioner ; and, if 
the facts of servitude, ownership, and escape be established by competent 
evidence, the commissioner shall grant a certificate to that effect, wh'ch certi- 
ficate shall be conclusive of the right of the person in whose favor it is issued 
to remove the fugitive to the State from which he fled. Then comes the 
clause which is supposed to suspend the habeas corpus: " And shall prevent all 
molestation of said person or persons by any process issued by any court, judge, 
magistrate, or other person whomsoever. " 

The question is asked, whether the writ of habeas corpus is not a " process " 
within the meaning of this act? I answer, that it undoubtedly is such a "pro- 
cess," and that it may be issued by any court or judge having competent 
authority — not for the purpose of " molesting" a claimant, having a servant 
in his possession, with such a certificate from the commissioner or judge, but 
for the purpose of ascertaining the fact whether he has such a certificate or 
not; and if so, whether it be in due form of law; and if not, by what authority 
he holds the servant in custody. Upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus, 
the claimant will be required to exhibit to the court his authority for conveying 
that servant back; and if he produces a " certificate" from the commissioner 
or judge, in due form of law, the court will decide that it has no power to " molest 
the claimant" in the exercise of his rights under the law and the Constitution. 
But if the claimant is not able to produce such certificate, or other lawful 
authority, or produces one which is not in conformity with law, the court will 
set the alleged servant at liberty, for the very reason that the law has not been 
complied with. The sole object of the writ of habeas corpus is to ascertain 
by what authority a person is held in custody; to release him, if no such au- 
thority be shown; and to refrain from any molestation of the claimant, if legal 
authority be produced. The habeas corpus is necessary, therefore, to carry 
the Fugitive law into effect, and, at the same time, to prevent a violation 
of the rights of freemen under it. It is essential to the security of the claim- 
ant, as well as the protection of the rights of those liable to be arrested under 
it. The reason that the writ of habeas corpus was not mentioned in the bill 
must be obvious. The object of the new law seems to have been, to amend 
the old one in those particulars wherein experience had proven amendments to 
be necessary, and in all other respects to leave it as it had stood from the 
days of Washington. The provisions of the old law have been subjected to the 
test of long experience — to the scrutiny of the bar and the judgment of the 
courts. The writ of habeas corpus had been adjudged to exist in all cases 
under it, and had always been resorted to when a proper case arose. In 



17 

amending the law there was no necessity for any new provision upon this sub- 
ject, because nobody desired to change it in this respect. 

But why this extraordinary effort, on the part of the professed friends of the 
fugitive, to force such a construction upon the law, in the absence of any such 
obnoxious provision, as to deprive him of the benefit of the writ of habeas cor- 
pus? The law does not do so in terms; and if it is ever accomplished, it must 
be done by implication, contrary to the understanding of those who enacted it, 
and in opposition to the practice of the courts, acquiesced in by the people, from 
the foundation of (he government. One would naturally suppose, that if there 
was room for doubt as to what is the true construction, those who claim to be 
the especial and exclusive friends of the negro would contend for that construc- 
tion which is most favorable to liberty, justice, and humanity. But not so. 
Directly the reverse is the fact. They exhaust their learning, and exert all their 
ingenuity and skill, to deprive the negro of all rights under the law. What can 
be the motive? Certainly not to protect the rights of the free, or to extend 
liberty to the oppressed; for they strive to fasten upon the law such a construc- 
tion as would defeat both of these ends. Can it be a political scheme, to ren- 
der the law odious, and to excite prejudice against all who voted for it, or were 
unavoidably absent when it passed ? No matter what the motive, the effect 
would be disastrous to those whose rights they profess to cherish, if their efforts 
should be successful. 

Now, a word or two in regard to the right of trial by jury. The city council, 
in their resolutions, say that this law abolishes that right. I have already shown 
you that the council are mistaken — that the law is silent upon the subject, and 
stands now precisely as it has stood for half a century. If the law is defective 
on that point, the error was committed by our fathers in 1793, and the people 
have acquiesced in it ever since, without knowing of its existence or caring to 
remedy it. The new act neither takes away nor confers the right of trial by 
jury. It leaves it just where our fathers and the Constitution left it under the 
old law. That the right of trial by jury exists in this country for all men, black 
or white, bond or free, guilty or innocent, no man will be disposed to question 
who understands the subject. The right is of universal application, and exists 
alike in all the States of the Union; it always has existed, and always will exist, 
so long as the Constitution of the United States shall be respected and main- 
tained, in spite of the efforts of the abolitionists to take it away by a perversion 
of the Fugitive law. The only question is, where shall this jury trial take place? 
Shall the jury trial be had in the State where the arrest is made, or the State 
from which the fugitive escaped ? Upon this point the act of last session says 
nothing, and, of course, leaves the matter as it stood under the law of '93. 
The old law was silent on this point, and therefore left the courts to decide it 
in accordance with the Constitution. The highest judicial tribunals in the land 
have always held that the jury trial must take place in the State under whose 



IS 

jurisdiction the question arose, and whose laws were alleged to have been vio- 
lated. The same construction has always been given to the law for surrender- 
ing fugitives from justice. It provides also for sending back the fugitive, but 
say- nothing about the jury trial, or where it shall take place. Who ever sup- 
posed that that act abolished the right of trial by jury? Every day's practice 
and observation teach us otherwise. The jury trial is always had in the State 
from which the fugitive fled. So it is with a fugitive from labor. When he 
returns, or is surrendered under the iaw r , he is entitled to a trial by jury of his 
right of freedom, and always has it when he demands it. There is great uni- 
formity in the mode of proceeding in the courts of the southern States in this 
respect. When the supposed slave sets up his claim, to the judge or other offi- 
cer, that he is free, and claims his freedom, it becomes the duty of the court to 
issue its summons to the master to appear in court with the alleged slave, and 
there to direct an issue of freedom or servitude to be made and tried by a jury. 
The master is also required to enter into bonds for his own appearance and that 
of the alleged slave at the trial of the cause, and that he will not remove the 
slave from the county or jurisdiction of the court in the mean time. The court 
is also required to appoint counsel to conduct the cause for the slave, while the 
master employs his own counsel. All the officers of the. court are required by 
law to render all facilities to the slave for the prosecution of his suit free of 
charge, such as issuing and serving subpoenas for witnesses, &c. If upon tht 
trial the alleged slave is held to be a free man, the master is required to pa}- the 
costs on both sides. If, on the other hand, he is held to be a slave, the State 
pays the costs. This is the way in which the trial by jury stood under the old 
law; and the new one makes no change in this respect. If the act of la.-t ses- 
sion be repealed, that will neither benefit nor injure the fugitive, so far as the 
right of trial by jury is concerned. 

For these two reasons — the habeas corpus and the trial by jury — the common 
council have pronounced the law unconstitutional, and declared that it ought 
not to be respected by an enlightened community. I have shown that neither 
of the objections are well founded, and that if they had taken the trouble to 
read the law before they nullified it, they would have avoided the mistake into 
which they have fallen. I have spoken of the acts of the city council in gene- 
ral terms, and it may be inferred that the vote was unanimous. I take pleasure 
in stating that I learn from the published proceedings that there was barely a 
quorum present, and that Aldermen Page and Williams voted in the negative. 

Having disposed of the two reasons assigned by the common council for the 
nullification of the law, I shall be greatly indebted to any gentleman who will 
point out any other objection to the new law, which does not apply with equal 
force to the old one. My object in drawing the parallel between the new and 
old law is this : The law of '93 was passed by the patriots and sages who 
framed our glorious Constitution, and approved by the father of his countrv. 



19 

I have always been taught to believe that they were men well versed in the 
science of government, devotedly attached to the cause of freedom, and capa- 
ble of construing the Constitution in the spirit in which they made it. That 
act has been enforced and acquiesced in for more than half a century, without 
a murmur or word of complaint from any quarter. 

I repeat — will any gentleman be kind enough to point out a single objection 
to the new law, which might not be urged with equal propriety to the act 
of '93 ? 

[Here a gentleman present rose, and called the attention of Mr. Dougla< to 
the penalties in the seventh section of the new law, and desired to know if 
there were any such obnoxious provisions in the old one.] 

Mr. Douglas then read the section referred to, and also the fourth section 
of the act of '93, and proceeded to draw the parallel between them. Each 
makes it a criminal offence to resist the due execution of the law; to knowingly 
and wilfully obstruct or hinder the claimant in the arrest of the fugitive; to 
rescue such fugitive from the claimant when arrested; to harbor or conceal 
such person after notice that he or she was a fugitive from labor. In this 
respect the two laws were substantially the same in every important particular. 
Indeed the one was almost a literal copy of the other. I can conceive of no 
act which would be an offence under the one, that would not be punishable 
under the other. In the speeches last night, great importance was given to 
the clause which makes it an offence to harbor or conceal a fugitive. You 
were told that you could not clothe the naked, nor feed the hungry, nor exer- 
cise the ordinary charities towards suffering humanity, without incurring the 
penalty of the law. Is this a true construction of that provision ? The act 
does not so read. The law says that you shall not " harbor or conceal such 
fugitive, so as to prevent the discovery and arrest of such person after notice or 
knowledge of the fact that such person was a fugitive from service or labor as 
aforesaid." This does not deprive you of the privilege of extending' charities 
to the fugitive. You may feed him, clothe him, may lodge him, provided you 
do not harbor or conceal him, so as to prevent discovery and arrest, after notice 
or knowledge that he is a fugitive. The offence consists in preventing the dis- 
covery and arrest of the fugitive after knowledge of the fact, and not in ex- 
tending kindness and charities to him. This is the construction put upon a 
similar provision in the old law by the highest judicial tribunals in the land. 
The only difference between the old law and the new one, in 'respect to ob- 
structing its execution, is to be found in the amount of the penalty, and not in 
the principle involved. 

But it is further objected that the new law provides, in addition to the penalty 
for a civil suit for damages, to be recovered by an action of debt by any court 
having jurisdiction of the cause. This is true; but it is also true that a similar 



20 

provision is to be found in the old law. The concluding clause in the last sec- 
tion of the act of '93 is as follows : 

" Which penalty may be recovered by and for the benefit of such claimant, 
by action of debt, in any proper court to try the same; saving, moreover, to the 
person claiming such labor or service, his right of action for or on account of 
the said injuries, or either of them.'*'' 

Thus it will be seen, that upon this point there is no difference between the 
new and the old law. 

Is there any other provision of this law upon which explanation is desired ? 

[A gentleman present referred to the 10th section, and desired an explana- 
tion of the object and effect of the record from another State therein pro- 
vided for.] 

I am glad, said Mr. D., that my attention has been called to that provision;, 
for I heard a construction given to it, in the speeches last night, entirely dif- 
ferent to the plain reading and object of that section. It is said, that this 
provision authorizes the claimant to go before a court of record of the county 
and State where he lives, and there establish by ex parte testimony, in the 
absence of the fugitive, the facts of servitude, of ownership, and escape; and 
when a record of these facts shall have been made, containing a minute 
description of the slave, it shall be conclusive evidence against a person cor- 
responding to that description, arrested in another State, and shall consign the 
person so arrested to perpetual servitude. The law contemplates no such 
thing, and authorizes no such result. I have the charity to believe that those 
who have put this construction upon it have not carefully examined it. The 
record from another State predicated upon u satisfactory proof to such court or 
judge" before whom the testimony may be adduced, and the record made, is 
to be conclusive of two facts only: 

1st. That the person named in the record does owe service to the person in 
whose behalf the record is made. 

2d. That such person has escaped from service. 

The language of the law is, that "the transcript of the record authenticated," 
&c, " shall be held and taken to be full and conclusive evidence of the fact of 
escape, and that the service or labor of such person escaping is due to the 
party in such record mentioned." The record is conclusive of these two 
facts, so far as to authorize the fugitive to be sent back for trial under the laws 
of the State whence he fled; but it is no evidence that the person arrested here 
is the fugitive named in the record. The question of identity is to be proven 
here to the satisfaction of the commissioner or judge, before whom the trial is 
had, by " other and further evidence." This is the great point in the case. 
The whole question turns upon it. The man arrested may correspond to the 
description set forth in the record, and yet not be the same individual. We 



21 

often meet persons resembling each other to such an extent that the one is 
frequently mistaken for the other. The identity of the person becomes a mat- 
ter of proof — a fact to be established by the testimony of competent and 
disinterested witnesses, and to be decided by the tribunal before whom the 
trial is had, conscientiously and impartially, according to the evidence in the 
case. The description in the record, unsupported by other testimony, is not 
evidence of the identity. It is not inserted for the especial benefit of the 
claimant — much less to the prejudice of the alleged slave. It is required as a test 
of truth, a safe-guard against fraud, which will often operate favorably to the 
fugitive, but never to his injury. If the description be accurate and true, no 
injustice can possibly result from it. But if it be erroneous or false, the 
claimant is concluded by it; and the fugitive, availing himself of the error, 
defeats the claim, in the same manner as a discrepancy between the allega- 
tions and the proof, in any other case, results to the advantage of the defend- 
ant. I repeat, that when an arrest is made under a record from another State, 
the identity of the person must be established by competent testimony. The 
trial, in this instance, would be precisely the same as in the case of a white 
man arrested on the charge of being a fugitive from justice. The writ of the 
governor, predicated upon an indictment, or even an affidavit, from another 
State, containing the charge of crime, would be conclusive evidence of the 
right to take the fugitive back; but the identity of the person in that case, as 
well as a fugitive from labor, must be proven in the State where the arrest is 
made, by competent witnesses, before the tribunal provided by law for that 
purpose. In this respect, therefore, the negro is placed upon a perfect equality 
with the white man who is so unfortunate as to be charged with an offence in 
another State, whether the charge be true or false. In some respects, the law 
guards the rights of the negro, charged with being a fugitive from labor, more 
rigidly than it does those of a white man who is alleged to be a fugitive from 
justice. The record from another State must be predicated upon " proof satis- 
factory to the court or judge" before whom it is made, and must set forth the 
u matter proved," before it can be evidence against a fugitive from labor, or for 
any purpose; whereas, an innocent white man, who is so unfortunate as to be 
falsely charged with a crime in another State, by the simple affidavit of an 
unknown person, without indictment, or proof to the satisfaction of any court, 
is liable to be transported to the most distant portions of this Union for trial. 
Here we find the act of last session is a great improvement upon the law of 
'93 in reference to fugitives, white or black, whether they fled from justice or 
labor. But it is objected that the testimony before the court making the record 
is ex parte, and therefore in violation of the principles of justice and the Consti- 
tution, because it deprives the accused of the privilege of meeting the wit- 
nesses face to face, and of cross examination. Gentlemen forget that all pro- 
ceedings for the arrest of fugitives are necessarily ex parte, from the nature of 



22 

the case. They have fled beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and the object 
of the proceeding is that they may be brought back, confront the witnesses, 
and receive a fair trial according to the constitution and laws. If they would 
stay at home in order to attend the trial and cross examine the witnesses, the 
record would be unnecessary, and the Fugitive law in operative. It is no an- 
swer to this proposition to say that slavery is no crime, and therefore the par- 
allel does not hold good. I am not speaking of the guilt or innocence of sla- 
very. I am discussing our obligations under the constitution of the United 
States. That sacred instrument says that a fugitive from labf- "shall be de- 
livered up on the claim of the owner. The same clause of the same instrument 
provides that fugitives from justice shall be delivered up. We are bound by 
our oaths to our God to see that claim as well as every other provision of the Con- 
stitution carried into effect. The moral, religious, and constitutional obligations 
resting upon us, here and hereafter, are the same in the one case as in the other. 
As citizens, owing allegiance to the Government and duties to society, we 
have no right to interpose our individual opinions and scruples as excuses for 
violating the supreme law of the land as our fathers made it, and as we are 
sworn to support it. The obligation is just as sacred, under the Constitution, to 
surrender fugitives from labor as fugitives from justice. And the Congress of 
the United States, according to the decision of the Supreme Court, are as im- 
peratively commanded to provide the necessary legislation for the one as for 
the other. The act of 1793, to which I have had occasion to refer so fre- 
quently, and which has been read to you, provided for these two cases in the 
same bill. The first half of that act, relating to fugitives from justice, applies, 
from the nature and necessity of the case, principally to white men; and the 
other half, for the same reasons, applies exclusively to the negro race. I have 
shown you, by reading and comparing the two laws in your presence, that 
there is no constitutional guaranty — or common law right — or legal, or judicial 
privilege — for the protection of the white man against oppression and injustice, 
under the law, framed in 1793, and now in force, for the surrender of fugitives 
from justice, that does not apply in all its force in behalf of the negro, when 
arrested as a fugitive from labor, under the act of the last session. What more 
can the friends of the negro ask than, in all his civil and legal rights under the 
Constitution, he shall be placed on an equal footing with the white man? But 
it is said that the law is susceptible of being abused by perjury and false tes- 
timony. To what human enactment does not the same objection lie? You, or 
I, or any other man, who was never in California in his life, are liable, under 
the constitution, to be sent there in chains for trial as a fugitive from justice by 
means of perjury and fraud. But does this fact prove that the Constitution, and 
the laws for carrying it into effect, are wrong, and should be resisted, as we 
were told last night, even unto the dungeon, the gibbet, and the grave? It 
only demonstrates to us the necessity of providing all the safeguards, that the 



23 

wit of man can devise, for the protection of the innocent and the free, at the 
same time that we religiously enforce, according to its letter and spirit, every 
provision of the Constitution. I will not say that the act recently passed for 
the surrender of fugitives from labor accomplishes all this; but I will thank 
any gentleman to point out any one barrier against abuse in the old law, or in 
the law for the surrender of white men, as fugitives from justice, that is not 
secured to the negro under the new law. I pause in order to give any gentle- 
man an opportunity to point out the provision. I invite inquiry and examina- 
tion. My object is to arrive at the truth — to repel error and dissipate preju- 
dice — and to avoid violence and bloodshed. Will any gentleman point out the 
provision in the old law, for securing and vindicating the rights of the free man, 
that is not secured to him in the act of last session? 

[A gentleman present rose and called the attention of Mr. Douglas to the 
provision for paying out of the Treasury of the United States the expenses of 
carrying the fugitive back in case of anticipated resistance.] 

Ah, said Mr. D., that is a question of dollars and cents, involving no other 
principle than the costs of the proceeding! I was discussing the question of 
human rights — the mode of protecting the rights of freemen from invasion, 
and the obligation to surrender fugitives under the Constitution. Is it possible 
that this momentous question, which, only forty-eight hours ago, was deemed 
of sufficient importance to authorize the city council to nullify an act of Con- 
gress, and raise the standard of rebellion against the Federal Government, has 
dwindled down into a mere petty dispute, who shall pay the costs of suit? 
This is too grave a question for me to discuss on this occasion. I confess my 
utter inability to do it justice. Yesterday the Constitution of the ocean-bound 
Republic had been overthrown; the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus 
had been suspended; the right of trial by jury had been abolished; pains and 
penalties had been imposed upon every humane citizen Avho should feed, the 
hungry and cover the naked; the law of God had been outraged by an infa- 
mous act of a traitorous Congress; and the standard of rebellion, raised by our 
city fathers, was floating in the breeze, calling on all good citizens to rally 

under its sacred folds, and resist with fire and sword the payment of the 

costs of suit upon the arrest of a fugitive from labor! 

I will pass over this point, and inquire whether there is any other provision 
of this law upon which an explanation is desired? I hope no one will be back- 
ward in propounding inquiries, for I have but a few days to remain with you, 
and desire to make a clean business of this matter on the present occasion. Is 
there any other objection? 

[A gentleman rose, and desired to know why the bill provides for paying ten 
dollars to the commissioner for his fee in case he decided in favor of the claim- 
ant, and only five dollars if he decided against him.] 



24 

I presume, said Mr. Douglas, the reason was that he would have more 
labor to perform. If, after hearing the testimony, the commissioner decided 
in favor of the claimant, the law made it his duty to prepare and authenticate 
the necessary papers to authorize him to carry the fugitive home; but if he 
decided against him, he had no such labor to perform. The law seems to be 
based upon the principle that the commissioner should be paid according to the 
service he should render — five dollars for presiding at the trial, and five dollars 
for making out the papers in case the testimony should require him to return the 
fugitive. This provision appears to be exciting considerable attention in the 
country, and I have been exceedingly gratified at the proceedings of a mass 
meeting held in a county not far distant, in which it was resolved unanimous- 
ly that they could not be bribed, for the sum of five dollars, to consign a free- 
man to perpetual bondage! This shows an exalted state of moral feeling, 
highly creditable to those who participated in the meeting. I doubt not they 
will make their influence felt throughout the State, and will instruct their 
members of the legislature to reform our criminal code in this respect. Un- 
der our laws, as they have stood for many years, and probably from the organ- 
ization of our State government, in all criminal cases, on the preliminary 
examination before the magistrates, and in all the higher courts, if the prisoner 
be convicted, the witnesses, jurors, and officers are entitled to their fees and 
bills of costs; but if he be acquitted, none of them receive a cent. In order to 
diffuse the same high moral sense throughout the whole community, would it 
not be well, at their next meeting, to pass another resolution, that they would 
not be bribed by the fees and costs of suit in any case, either as witnesses, 
jurors, magistrates, or in any other capacity, to consign an innocent man to a 
dismal cell in the penitentiary, or expose him to an ignominious death upon 
the gallows? Such a resolution might do a great deal of good in elevating the 
character of our people abroad, at the same time that it might inspire increased 
confidence in the liberality and conscientiousness of those who adopted it! 

Is there any other objection to this law? 

[A gentleman rose, and called the attention of Mr. Douglas to the provision 
vesting the appointment of the Commissioners under it in the courts of law, 
instead of the President and Senate, and asked if that was not a violation of 
that provision of the Constitution which says that Judges of the Supreme 
Courts, and of the inferior courts, should be appointed by the President and 
Senate.] 

I thank the gentleman, said Mr. D., for calling my attention to this point. 
It was made in the speech of a distinguished lawyer last night, and evidently pro- 
duced great effect upon the minds of the audience. The gentleman's high pro- 
fessional standing, taken in connexion with his laborious preparation for the 
occasion, as was apparent to all, from his lengthy written brief before him, 



25 

while speaking, inspired implicit confidence in the correctness of his position. 
My answer to the objection will be found in the Constitution itself, which I 
will read, so far as it bears upon this question : 

" The President shall nominate, and by and with the consent of the Senate, 
shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, Judges of the 
Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, where appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law." 

Now it will be seen that the words " inferior courts" are not mentioned in 
the Constitution. The gentleman in his zeal against the law, and his frenzy 
to resist it, interpolated these words, and then made a plausible argument upon 
them. I trust this was all unintentional, or was done with the view of fulfil- 
ling the " higher law." But there is another sentence in this same clause of 
the Constitution which I have not yet read. It is as follows: 

" But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers 
as they think proper in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the 
heads of Departments." 

The practise under this clause has usually been to confer the power of ap- 
pointingthose inferior officers, whose duties were executive or ministerial, upon 
the President alone, or upon the head of the appropriate department ; and in 
like manner to give to the courts of law the privilege of appointing their sub- 
ordinates, whose duties were in their nature judicial. What is meant by "in- 
ferior officers," whose appointment may be vested in the " courts of law," 
will be seen by reference to the 8th section of the Constitution, where the 
powers of Congress are enumerated, and among them is the following : 

"To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court." 

Is the tribunal which is to carry the fugitive law into effect inferior to the 
Supreme Court of the United States ? If it is, the Constitution expressly pro- 
vides for vesting the appointment in the courts of law. I will remark, how- 
ever, that these commissioners are not appointed under the new law, but in 
obedience to an act of Congress which has stood on the statute books for 
many years. If those who denounce and misrepresent the act of last session, 
had condescended to read it before they undertook to enlighten the people 
upon it, they would have saved themselves the mortification of exposure, as I 
will show by reading the first section. 

Here Mr. Douglas read the law, and proceeded to remark : Thus it will be 
seen that these commissioners have been in office for years, with their duties 
prescribed by law, nearly all of which were of a judicial character, and that 
the new law only imposes additional duties, and authorizes the increase of the 
number. Why has not this grave constitutional objection been discovered be- 
fore, and the people informed how their rights have been outraged in violation 
of the supreme law of the land ? Truly, the passage of the Fugitive bill has 
thrown a flood of light upon constitutional principles ! 



26 

Is there any other objection to the new law which does not apply to the act 
of '93 ? 

[A gentleman rose, and said that he would like to ask another question, 
which was this: if the new law was so similar to the old one, what was the ne- 
cessity of passing any at all, since the old one was still in force ?] 

Mr. Douglas, in reply, said, that is the very question I was anxious some 
one should propound, because I was desirous of an opportunity of answering 
it. The old law answered all the purposes for which it was enacted tolerably 
well, until the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case 
of Priggs vs. the State of Pennsylvania, eight or nine years ago. That deci- 
sion rendered the law comparatively inoperative, for the reason that there was 
scarcely any officers left to execute it. It will be recollected that the act of 
'93 imposed the duty of carrying it into effect upon the magistrates and other 
officers under the State governments. These officers performed their duties 
under that law, with fidelity, for about fifty years, until the Supreme Court, in 
the case alluded to, decided that they were under no legal obligation to do so, 
and that Congress had no constitutional power to impose the duty upon them. 
From that time, many of the officers refused to act, and soon afterwards the 
legislature of Massachusetts, and many other States, passed laws making it 
criminal for their officers to perform these duties. Hence the old law, although 
efficient in its provisions, and similar in most respects, and especially in those 
now objected to, almost identical with the new law, became comparatively a 
dead letter for want of officers to carry it into effect. The judges of the United 
States courts were the only officers left who were authorized to execute it. 
In this State for instance, Judge Drummond, whose residence was in the ex- 
treme northwest corner of the State, within six miles of Wisconsin and three 
of Iowa, and in the direction where fugitives were least likely to go, was the 
only person authorized to try the case. 

If a fugitive was arrested at Shawneetown or Alton, three or four hundred 
miles from the residence of the judge, the master would attempt to take him 
across the river to his home in Kentucky or Missouri, without first establishing 
his right to do so. This was calculated to excite uneasiness and doubts in the 
minds of our citizens, as to the propriety of permitting the negro to be carried 
out of the State, without the fact of his owing service, and having escaped, 
being first proved, lest it might turn out that the negro was a free man and the 
claimant a kidnapper. And yet, according to the express terms of the old law, 
the master was authorized to seize his slave wherever he found him, and to 
carry him back without process, or trial, or proof of any kind whatsoever. 
Hence, it was necessary to pass the act of last session, in order to carry into 
effect, in a peaceable and orderly manner, the provisions of the law and the 
Constitution on the one hand, and to protect the free colored man from being 
kidnapped and sold into slavery by unprincipled men on the other hand. The 



27 

purpose of the new law is to accomplish these two objects — to appoint officers 
to carry the law into effect, in the place of the magistrates relieved from that 
duty by the decision of the Supreme Court, and to guard against harassing 
and kidnapping the free blacks, by preventing the claimant from carrying the 
negro out of the State, until he establishes his legal right to do so. The new 
law, therefore, is a great improvement in this respect upon the old one, and is 
more favorable to justice and freedom, and better guarded against abuse. 

[A person present asked leave to propound another question to Mr. Douglas, 
which was this: "If the new law is more favorable to freedom than the old 
one, why did the southern slaveholders vote for it, and desire its passage ?"] 

Mr. Douglas said he would answer that question with a great deal of pleasure. 
The southern members voted for it for the reason that it was a better law than 
the old one — better for them, better for us, and better for the free blacks. It 
places the execution of the law in the hands of responsible officers of the 
government, instead of leaving every man to take the law into his own hands 
and to execute it for himself. It affords personal security to the claimant 
while arresting his servant and taking him back, by providing him with the 
opportunity of establishing his legal rights by competent testimony before a 
tribunal duly authorized to try the case, and thus allay all apprehensions and 
suspicions, on the part of our citizens, that he is a villain, attempting to steal a 
free man for the purpose of selling him into slavery. The slaveholder has as 
strong a desire to protect the rights of the free black man as we have, and 
much more interest to do so; for he well knows, that if outrages should be tol- 
erated under the law, and free men are seized and carried into slavery; from 
that moment the indignant outcry against it would be so strong here and every- 
where, that even a fugitive from labor could not be returned, lest he also might 
happen to be free. The interest of the slaveholder, therefore, requires a law 
which shall protect the rights of all free men, black or white, from any invasion 
or violation whatever. I ask the question, therefore, whether this law is not 
better than the old one — better for the North and the South — better for the 
peace and quiet of the whole country ? Let it be remembered that this law is 
but an amendment to the act of '93, and that the old law still remains in force, 
except so far as it is modified by this. Every man who voted against this 
modification, thereby voted to leave the old law in force; for I am not aware 
that any member of either House of Congress ever had the hardihood to propose 
to repeal the law, and make no provisions for carrying the Constitution into 
effect. But the cry of repeal, as to the new law, has already gone forth. 
Well, suppose it succeeds; what will those have gained who joined in the shout ? 
Have I not shown that all the material objections they urge against the new 
law, apply with equal force to the old one ? What do they gain, therefore, 
unless they propose to repeal the old law, also, and make no provision for per- 
forming our obligations under the Constitution ? This must be the object of all 



28 

men who take that position. To this it must come in the end. The 
real objection is not to the new law, nor to the old one, but to the Consti- 
tution itself. Those of you who hold these opinions, do not mean that the 
fugitive from labor shall be taken back. That is the real point of your objec- 
tion. You would not care a farthing about the new law, or the old law, or any 
other law, or what provisions it contained, if there was a hole in it big enough 
for the fugitive to slip through and escape. Habeas corpuses — trials by jury — 
records from other States — pains and penalties — the whole catalogue of objec- 
tions, would be all moonshine, if the negro was not required to go back to his 
master. Tell me, frankly, is not this the true character of your objection ? 

[Here several gentlemen gave an affirmative answer.] 

Mr. Douglas said he would answer that objection by reading a portion of the 
Constitution of the United States. He then read as follows : 

" No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, 
be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on the 
claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." 

This, said Mr. D., is the supreme law of the land, speaking to every citizen 
of the republic. The command is imperative. There is no avoiding — no 
escaping the obligation, so long as we live under, and claim the protection of, 
the Constitution. We must yield implicit obedience, or we must take the 
necessary steps to release ourselves from the obligation to obey. There is no 
other alternative. We must stand by the Constitution of the Union, with all its 
compromises, or we must abolish it, and resolve each State back into its original 
elements. It is, therefore, a question of union or disunion. We cannot 
expect our brethren of other States to remain faithful to the compact, and per- 
mit us to be faithless. Are we prepared, therefore, to execute faithfully and 
honestly the compact our fathers have made for us? 

[Here a gentleman rose, and inquired of Mr. Douglas, whether the clause 
in the Constitution providing for the surrender of fugitive slaves was not in 
violation of the law of God?] 

Mr. ! 'ouglas in reply — The divine law is appealed to as authority for disre- 
garding our most sacred duties to society. The city council have appealed to 
it, as their excuse for nullifying an act of Congress; and a committee embodied 
the same principle in their resolutions to the meeting in this hall last night, as 
applicable both to the Constitution and laws. The general proposition that there 
is a law paramount to all human enactments— the law of the Supreme Ruler of 
the Universe— I trust that no civilized and Christian people is prepared to 
question, much less deny. We should all recognise, respect, and revere the 
divine law. But we should bear in mind that the law of God, as revealed to 
us, is intended to operate on our consciences, and insure the performance of 
our duties as individuals and Christians. The divine law does not prescribe 



29 

the form of government under which we shall Jive, and the character of our 
political and civil institutions. Revelation has not furnished us with a con- 
stitution — a code of international law — and a system of civil and municipal 
jurisprudence. It has not determined the right of persons and property — 
much less the peculiar privileges which shall be awarded to each class of per- 
sons under any particular form of government. God has created man in his 
own image, and endowed him with the right of self-government, so soon as he 
shall evince the requisite intelligence, virtue, and capacity to assert and enjoy 
the privilege. The history of the world furnishes few examples where any 
considerable portion of the human race have shown themselves sufficiently 
enlightened and civilized to exercise the rights and enjoy the blessings of free- 
dom. In Asia and Africa we find nothing but ignorance, superstition, and 
despotism. Large portions of Europe and America can scarcely lay claim to 
civilization and Christianity; and a still smaller portion have demonstrated their 
capacity for self-government. Is all this contrary to the laws of God? And 
if so, who is responsible? The civilized world have always held, that when 
any race of men have shown themselves so degraded, by ignorance, supersti- 
tion, cruelty, and barbarism, as to be utterly incapable of governing them- 
selves, they must, in the nature of things, be governed by others, by such 
laws as are deemed applicable to their condition. It is upon this principle 
alone that England justifies the form of government she has established in the 
Indies, and for some of her other colonies — that Russia justifies herself in hold- 
ing her serfs as slaves, and selling them as a part of the land on which they 
live — that our Pilgrim Fathers justified themselves in reducing the negro and 
Indian to servitude, and selling them as property — that we, in Illinois and most 
of the free States, justify ourselves in denying the negro and the Indian the 
privilege of voting, and all other political rights — and that many of the States 
of the Union justify themselves in depriving the white man of the right of the 
elective franchise, unless he is fortunate enough to own a certain amount of 
property. 

These things certainly violate the principle of absolute equality among men, 
when considered as component parts of a political society or government, and 
so do many provisions of the Constitution of the United States, as well as the 
several States of the Union. In fact, no government ever existed on earth in 
which there was a perfect equality, in all things, among those composing it and 
governed by it. Neither sacred nor profane history furnishes an example. If 
inequality in the form and principles of government is therefore to be deemed 
a violation of the laws of God, and punishable as such, who is to escape? 
Under this principle all Christendom is doomed, and no Pagan can hope for 
mercy! Many of these things are, in my opinion, unwise and unjust, and, of 
course, subversive of Republican principles; but I am not prepared to say that 
the}' are either sanctioned or condemned by the divine law. Who can assert 



30 

that God has prescribed the form and principles of government, and the char- 
acter of the political, municipal, and domestic institutions of men on earth? 
This doctrine would annihilate the fundamental principle upon which our 
political svstem rests. Our forefathers held that the people had an inherent 
rio-ht to establish such Constitution and laws for the government of themselves 
and their posterity, as they should deem best calculated to insure the protec- 
tion of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that the same might be 
altered and changed as experience should satisfy them to be necessary and 
proper. Upon this principle the Constitution of the United States was formed, 
and our glorious Union established. All acts of Congress passed in pursuance 
of the Constitution are declared to be the supreme laws of the land, and the 
Supreme Court of the United States is charged with expounding the same. 
All officers and magistrates, under the Federal and State Governments — execu- 
tive, legislative, judicial, and ministerial — are required to take an oath to sup- 
port the Constitution, before they can enter upon the performance of their 
respective duties. Any citizen, therefore, who, in his conscience, believes 
that the Constitution of the United States is in violation of a "higher law," 
has no right, as an honest man, to take office under it, or exercise any other 
function of citizenship conferred by it. Every person born under the Consti- 
tution owes allegiance to it; and every naturalized citizen takes an oath to 
support it. Fidelity to the Constitution is the only passport to the enjoyment 
of rights under it. When a Senator elect presents his credentials, he is not 
allowed to take his seat until he places his hand upon the holy evangelist, 
and appeals to his God for the sincerity of his vow to support the Constitution. 
He, who does this, with a mental reservation or secret intention to disregard 
any provision ol the Constitution, commits a double crime — is morally guilty 
of perfidy to his God and treason to his country! 

If the Constitution of the United States is to be repudiated upon the ground 
that it is repugnant to the divine law, where are the friends of freedom and 
Christianity to'look for another and a better? Who is to be the prophet to 
reveal the will of God and establish a Theocracy for us? 

Is he to be found in the ranks of northern abolitionism, or of southern dis- 
union; or is the common council of the city of Chicago to have the distinguish- 
ed honor of furnishing the chosen one? I will not venture to inquire what are 
to be the form and principles of the new government, or to whom is to be in- 
trusted the execution of its sacred functions; for, when we decide that the 
wisdom of our revolutionary fathers was foolishness,, and their piety wicked- 
ness, and destroy the only system of self government that has ever realized 
the hopes of the friends of freedom, and commanded the respect of mankind, 
it becomes us to wait patiently until the purposes of the Latter Day Saints 
shall be revealed unto us. 

For my part, I am prepared to maintain and preserve inviolate the Con- 



31 

stitution as it is with all its compromises, to stand or fall by the American 
Union, clinging with the tenacity of life to all its glorious memories of the 
past and precious hopes of the future. 

Mr. Douglas then explained the circumstances which rendered his absence 
unavoidable when the vote was taken on the Fugitive bill in the Senate. He 
wished to avoid no responsibility on account of that absence, and therefore de- 
sired it to be distinctly understood that he should have voted for the bill if he could 
have been present. He referred to several of our most prominent and respect- 
ed citizens by name, as personally cognizant of the fact that he was anxious 
at that time to give that vote. He believed the passage of that or some other 
efficient law a solemn duty, imperatively demanded by the Constitution. In 
conclusion, Mr. D. made an earnest appeal to our citizens to rally as one man 
to the defence of the Constitution and laws, and above all things, and under 
all circumstances, to put down violence and disorder, by maintaining the supre- 
macy of the laws. He referred to our high character for law and order here- 
tofore, and also to *he favorable position of our city for commanding the trade 
between the North and South, through our canals and railroads, to show that 
our views and principles of action should be broad, liberal, and national, cal- 
culated to encourage union and harmony, instead of disunion and sectional 
bitterness. He concluded by remarking, that he considered this question of 
fidelity to the Constitution and supremacy of the laws, as so far paramount to all 
other considerations, that he had prepared some resolutions to cover these 
points only, which he would submit to the meeting, and take their judgment 
upon them. If he had consulted his own feelings and views only, he should 
have embraced in the resolutions a specific approval of all the measures of the 
compromise; but as the question of rebellion and resistance to the Federal Go- 
vernment has been distinctly presented, it has been thought advisable to meet 
that issue on this occasion, distinct and separate from all others. 

Mr. Douglas then offered the following resolutions, which were adopted with- 
out a dissenting voice: 

Resolved, That it is the sacred duty of every friend of the Union to maintain, and preserve 
inviolate, every provision of our Federal Constitution. 

Resolved, That any law enacted by Congress, in pursuance of the Constitution, should be 
respected as such by all good and law-abiding citizens ; and should be faithfully carried into 
effect by the officers charged with its execution. 

Resolved, That so long as the Constitution of the United States provides, that all persons held 
to service or labor in one State, escaping into another State, "shall be delivered up on the 
claim of the party to whom the service or labor may be due," and so long as members of Con- 
gress are required to take an oath to support the Constitution, it is their solemn and religious 
duty to pass all laws necessary to carry that provision of the Constitution into effect. 

Resolved, That if we desire to preserve the Union, and render our great Republic inseperable 
and perpetual, we must perform all our obligations under the Constitution, at the same time that 
we call upon our brethren in other States to yield implicit obedience to it. 

Resolved, That as the lives, property, and safety of ourselves and our families depend upon 
the observance and protection of the laws, every effort to excite any portion of our population 
to make resistance to the due execution of the laws of the land, should be promptly and em- 
phatically condemned by every good citizen. ' 

Resolved, That we will stand or fall by the American Union and its Constitution, with all its 
compromises ; with its glorious memories of the past and precious hopes of the future. 



32 

[The following was offered in addition by B. S. Morris, and also adopted:] 

Resolved, That we, the people of Chicago, repudiate the resolutions, passed by the common 
council of Chicago, upon the subject of the Fugitive Slave law passed by Congress at its last 
session. 

On the succeeding night the common council of the city repealed their nulli- 
fying lesolution by a vote of 12 to 1. 






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